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It contradicts earlier assumptions to find that the Soviet leadership, preoccupied as they were with the Polish crisis that had broken out on October 19, 1956, were expressly reluctant to comply with Ernő Gerő's demand and deploy Soviet forces stationed in Hungary to break up the demonstrations in Budapest on October 23. The ultimate decision to intervene followed repeated appeals for help during the evening, and above all pressure from Ambassador Andropov who judged the situation to be very serious (Szereda and Rainer, 1996: 26-27) . 3 The CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) Presidium discussed the matter late in the evening of October 23. By that time armed clashes had occurred in Budapest, and the situation in Hungary was thought by the Soviet leaders to be far graver than the one in Warsaw. The idea of postponing the discussion until the following day, when the Soviet Union's allies could be consulted at the Moscow summit (originally convened to discuss the situation in Poland), was not even raised. At the summit, there would have been a chance to make the decision jointly on whether Soviet troops stationed in Hungary should be deployed as the country's leadership had requested. In the meantime, however, a compromise was reached on the Polish crisis, with Moscow dropping the idea of armed intervention and Gomułka assuring the Soviets that the envisaged reforms would not endanger communist power or the unity of the Soviet bloc. Indeed, the Polish scenario might have been applied in Hungary too, in spite of the limited armed conflict that had broken out there.
At the Presidium meeting this was put very plainly by Mikoyan, a respected member of the Soviet leadership and the one who knew the Hungarian situation best:
"There is no way of mastering the movement without [Imre] Nagy and so this will make it cheaper for us as well…. What can we lose? Let the Hungarians restore order for themselves. Let us try political measures, and only after that send our troops in." (Kramer, 1996 (Kramer, -1997b .
In reality, this was the only rational option in the given situation, but the Presidium stood firm and eventually decided to order the Soviet troops stationing in Hungary to intervene and move into the capital.
The Soviet leadership, having tackled world political issues pragmatically since 1953-having, even in its last-minute solution to the Polish crisis, resisted its Cold War reflexes to use armed intervention on ideological and emotional grounds-proved incapable of biding its time and exercising such self-restraint in Hungary's case.
Khrushchev and his associates took the worst political decision from their own point of view, and gave rise to a process whose consequences would be just what armed intervention was supposed to spare them from. In other words, they achieved exactly the opposite of what they had wanted: not rapid pacification, but escalation of the sporadic armed actions into an extensive anti-Soviet war of liberation, of a kind unparalleled in the history of the Soviet bloc. Mikoyan's rational proposal, although defeated by his colleagues in the Presidium deserves special attention as it might rightly be dubbed "the Mikoyan Doctrine. Rákosi's, as due to his stomach disease he almost never smiled. Therefore, while his predecessor occasionally could play the role of a jovial dictator and could make an impression even on Western diplomats, Gerő was simply a stern-looking dictator. In reality, thus, the Soviets succeeded in finding the worst possible option to replace Rákosi. right away on October 24 with the kind of massive and drastic military action they were to employ on November 4, thus signaling clearly its unqualified determination to preserve the communist system at any cost, the revolutionary events of October 24-November 3 probably would not have ensued. Instead, Khrushchev and his associates became trapped by their initial wrong decision. Now they tried out the combination of an armed and a political solution, which the revolutionary public interpreted as weakness and uncertainty.
This misperception, quite a frequent feature of revolts against dictatorships, only further radicalized society.
The initial successes of the insurgent groups against the poorly organized Soviet units and the continual concessions by the Nagy government and the Kremlin eventually left the general impression that a revolutionary situation really had revolutionary possibilities: only persistence was needed to achieve the ultimate goal of a Western-type parliamentary democracy and full independence for the country. Yet present knowledge of the Soviet intentions makes it plain that any fundamental change was ruled out from the beginning and we can argue that the fate of the revolution was sealed even before it started, i.e. on October 22. The seed of ultimate catastrophe was sown in the demand for free elections, already one of the 16 Points compiled by students of the Technical University on that day, which became a nationwide general demand by the end of October. In Communist thinking, however, free, that is, multiparty, elections were tantamount to capitulation and treason, inevitably leading to the restoration of a bourgeois political system. Thus now there were only two possibilities. Either society would see in good time that the demand was excessive and voluntarily reduce its demands to a tolerable level-this seldom happens during a revolution, which is what makes it a revolution in the first place-or those exercising power in practice, in this case the Soviets, would decide to end the uncertainty and use force to inform the rebels of their error in thinking there was any chance for basic changes.
The most important new information on Soviet decision-making during the Hungarian Revolution emerging from the archives in Moscow was that the CPSU Presidium agreed unanimously on October 30 that the Soviet troops had to be withdrawn from Hungary, in case the Imre Nagy government requested this (Békés et al., 2002: 295-9 ). This truly surprising information was revealed by the so-called Malin notes, published in 1996 (Kramer, 1996 (Kramer, -1997b In reality, however, this decision was not at all about recognizing the success of [emphasis mine] for a long time" (Kramer, 1996 (Kramer, -1997b . It is characteristic that it was precisely Mikoyan who set forth the consequences of maintaining the status quo at any price in the most unambiguous terms-he, who otherwise consistently represented the most liberal viewpoint in the leadership regarding Hungary: "We simply cannot let Hungary to be removed from our camp," he said at the November 1 session of the Presidium, one day after the decision that the intervention was necessary, while in the meantime he tried to convince the others that the possibility of a political solution had not yet completely disappeared, and that they should wait another ten to fifteen days before invading (ibid.: 394).
The intended result of the Soviet concession on October 30 was thus not consenting to the restoration of the capitalist system and the independence of Hungary, but the consolidation of a situation akin to what happened in Poland, that is, the acceptance of the creation of a reformed communist system, displaying more independence internally, but remaining loyal to Moscow and within the confines of the Soviet bloc. shows that the historical chances for the revolution were only theoretical, as the Soviet proposal of October 30 was contingent on retaining the communist system and the unity of the Soviet bloc. The Imre Nagy government-or any other government or leader-had (or would have had) no chance of complying with these expectations given the sweeping 10 For a detailed elaboration of this interpretation see Békés, 2002. radical revolutionary changes that were triggered by the first Soviet intervention on October 24.
America: Inaction, non-intervention and indirect responsibility
The discord among the Western powers which came about as a result of the Middle Eastern conflict no doubt made things easier for the Soviets, though it is fairly certain that even without the Suez crisis they would have pursued a similar policy. To verify this statement, it is sufficient to examine the circumstances of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia: at that time the Western alliance's freedom of movement was not restricted by any internal conflict, yet the West still responded to the invasion aimed at rescuing the communist regime with the same passivity as in 1956. Moreover, we now know that US President Lyndon B. Johnson, who at the end of August 1968 condemned the intervention in Czechoslovakia in a high-sounding declaration to the public, barely a few weeks (!) later, in September, proposed a summit meeting with Brezhnev via diplomatic channels on Vietnam, the situation in the Middle East, and to discuss the issue of anti-missile systems (Békés, 2004: 236.; Dobrynin, 1995: 189-195) .
Therefore, Western passivity in 1956 was not caused by the Suez crisis, but by the limits to its range of options in Eastern Europe that were implicit in the prevailing European status quo and the notion of spheres of influence. The Suez crisis simply served as a handy excuse, especially for the United States, in order to explain why, after years of liberation propaganda, it was not capable of extending even the smallest amount of support to an East European nation which had risen in arms in an attempt to liberate itself from Soviet domination.
Against this background, it must be seen that there is no way that direct American or Western responsibility for the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution can be deduced.
We now know that in reality, the events which took place in Poland and, particularly, in 11 For the transcripts of two Radio Free Europe broadcasts to Hungary during the revolution see: Békés et al., 2002: 286-289 
